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Little is known about Xi Jinping, the Chinese leader who is to take overfrom Hu Jintao as General Secretary of the Central Committee of theCommunist Party this autumn, and the following spring as President
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Admittedly, since he was born into
the Party, the biography of this representative of the “red aristocracy” is
scarcely difficult to trace. He is the son of CCP veteran Xi Zhongxun and his
career and gradual rise to the top are familiar to all. He has spoken very
little, however, and on those occasions when he has put forward ideas, they
have always proved to be completely in tune with the political line of the
moment. It is particularly difficult in these circumstances to identify his
program and still less the slant he might give to the reforms and policies
currently underway in the People’s Republic. His style and behaviour in pub-
lic and international meetings are a little easier to understand. It would be
unwise, however, to draw too many conclusions, since these would neces-
sarily be over-hasty and impressionistic.
We must therefore base our arguments on the solid information we pos-
sess, not only on Xi but also on the current organisation of the institutions,
and draw a certain number of logical conclusions on the role he will be
called upon to play at the end of the CCP’s 18th Congress, as leader of the
world’s second largest economy and most populous country as well as one
of the most authoritarian polities. In short, our hypothesis is that he is nei-
ther a reformer nor a conservative but that circumstances will probably
oblige him to lean towards one rather than the other.
Biography and career of Xi Jinping
An early life full of incident
Xi Jinping’s official biography is fairly representative of the “princelings”
(taizidang) whose parents were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution,
then reinstated. Born on 1 June 1953 in Beijing, Jinping is the son of Xi
Zhongxun, who was born in Fuping in Shaanxi, future veteran of the Com-
munist Revolution and close collaborator of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in
the central government of the People’s Republic. The second of Xi
Zhongxun’s second wife’s four children, Jinping received a superior type of
education. At a very young age, after his father was appointed vice-premier
(1959), he moved with his family to Zhongnanhai, seat of Communist power
since 1949.
However, his father saw his career interrupted, not in 1966 during the up-
heavals of the Cultural Revolution like many other leaders close to Liu
Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (including, for example, Peng Zhen and Bo Yibo),
but in 1962. For having given his support to the publication of a biography
of Liu Zhidan, head of the Yan’an guerrilla base that with Gao Gang wel-
comed Mao Zedong and his army after the Long March in 1935, Xi
Zhongxun was accused of leading an “anti-Party” group. This project was
seen by Mao as veiled support for the rehabilitation of Gao Gang, who had
been ousted in 1954. But more generally, scarcely two years after the great
famine brought about by the Great Leap Forward (30 to 46 million victims),
Mao began to distance leaders he saw as too moderate. Consolidating the
powers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), already led by Marshal Lin
Biao, and of the political police, which had been taken in hand by the sinister
Kang Sheng, Mao decided at the same time to reintroduce “class struggle”
and, as a consequence, to launch the “socialist education movement.”
In 1962, Xi Zhongxun was thrown into prison – this was only known much
later – and his family had to leave Zhongnanhai. Four years later, Zhongxun’s
wife was sent to a labour camp in the countryside. Jinping’s school was
closed. Left to his own devices, he took advantage of the prevailing anarchy
and desertion of the libraries to read anything he came across. Soon after-
wards however, at the age of 14, Jinping was sent to Liangjiahe, a production
brigade (village) in the Yanchuan district to the north of Shaanxi near his
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father’s former guerrilla base. Living conditions there were difficult. Jinping
was looked upon with suspicion by the villagers, who found at first that he
lacked enthusiasm for the task in hand. After several months, he fled and
returned to Beijing. There he was arrested and sent for a time to a labour
camp before returning to Liangjiahe. This time, according to his official bi-
ography, Jinping set to work, learnt how to work in the fields, and avoided
complaining, unlike many “young educated people” (zhiqing) deported to
the countryside. In short, he adapted, integrated, and managed to gain the
respect of the peasants, all the more so since he displayed initiative and in-
genuity, introducing, for example, biogas production into the village using
fermented organic animal matter. But like many other young city-dwellers
sent to work in the fields (see Dai Sijie’s Balzac and the Little Chinese Seam-
stress, 2000), he arrived bearing a heavy box of books and continued to ed-
ucate himself.
Jinping was nonetheless not completely protected from political cam-
paigns. Like many leaders’ sons, he was asked to denounce his parents by
those promoted to positions of responsibility as a result of the Cultural Rev-
olution. The anecdote circulating in China since before the fall of Bo Xilai in
March-April 2012 is that unlike Bo, Jinping avoided accusing his father, ar-
guing that he had no knowledge of his ideas and actions since he had been
separated from him for too long.
The official story likewise tells us that despite the persecution of his family
(his half-sister is thought to have been killed at this time), Jinping never lost
confidence in the Party. He tried unsuccessfully to join the Communist Youth
League, ante-chamber of the CCP, at least eight times. He finally succeeded
in 1971 after inviting the local Party secretary to share some fried eggs and
mantou (steamed bread) in his cave, a type of dwelling still common on
the loess plateau of northern Shaanxi. (1) Can the virtues of corruption al-
ready be seen here? Be that as it may, after the Lin Biao affair (1971), al-
though Xi Zhongxun remained in detention, at least officially, his family
gradually emerged from the ranks of the untouchables, and in 1974, a year
after Deng Xiaoping was rehabilitated for the first time, Jinping managed
to join the Party. Shortly afterwards, elected by an overwhelming majority
by the villagers, he became secretary of the brigade’s Party committee.
However, the following year, in 1975, this same committee recommended
him for a place at university. At the time, this was the formal sine qua non
condition for gaining access to higher education. It was therefore on the in-
structions of the CCP that he entered Tsinghua University, where he studied
chemical engineering, a discipline he was never destined to exercise.
An exemplary but privileged cursus honorum
It was not until the death of Mao (1976), the fall of the “Gang of Four”
(Mao’s wife and other radicals produced by the Cultural Revolution), and
the second come-back of Deng that Xi Zhongxun returned to public life.
Rehabilitated in 1978, he soon afterwards became Party secretary of Guang-
dong Province, where from 1979 onwards he launched the first economic
reforms and, most importantly, set up the special economic zones of Shen-
zhen and Zhuhai. This major political development had a determining in-
fluence on Xi Jinping’s career. Indeed, his father (who died in 2002) used his
contacts to place his son as secretary (mishu) both in the State Council’s
Office of General Affairs and to his former comrade Geng Biao, then General
Secretary of the CCP’s Central Military Commission, presided over from De-
cember 1980 to November 1989 by none other than Deng Xiaoping. Xi Jin-
ping than served as an officer in the PLA, which according to his official
biography inculcated in him “a special affection for the Army.” (2) More im-
portantly, since it placed him in immediate proximity to the country’s main
leaders, for Xi Jinping, as for many other ambitious young cadres of his gen-
eration, his position as mishu acted as an effective springboard to his ca-
reer.
It was around this time that Xi Jinping married Ke Lingling, whose father
was the Chinese ambassador to Great Britain, and began to live in a privi-
leged environment once again. The young couple divorced three years later,
however, and it was then that Jinping’s political career took a more provin-
cial and strategic turn. From 1982 onwards, he accepted a long series of
local postings that gave him experience of both rural realities and the coun-
try’s rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. He was appointed deputy sec-
retary and then secretary of Zhengding District, near Shijiazhuang in Hebei.
In 1985, Xi Jinping was transferred to Fujian, thanks once again to his father,
who enjoyed a close relationship with Xiang Nan, then governor of the
province. (3) Xi was to remain in Fujian for 17 years. Appointed deputy mayor
of Xiamen in 1985, he participated until 1988 in the expansion of Fujian’s
most dynamic metropolis before being appointed to run Ningde, a rural pre-
fecture in a mountainous area northeast of Fujian, near Zhejiang Province.
It was also in 1985 that Xi Jinping made his first visit, as part of an official
delegation, to the United States and in particular Muscatine, Iowa, to ob-
serve and study American agriculture. He made a return “pilgrimage” there
in February 2012, this time on his first visit to America as Vice-President of
the Republic.
In 1986, aged 33 and hoping to remarry, Xi Jinping went on a blind date
with the famous PLA singer Peng Liyuan, who was later promoted to the
rank of major general (shaojiang). Once again, the Chinese media made
much of the conversation that Liyuan claims the two young people had:
Jinping apparently asked Liyuan what type of songs she sang, on the pretext
that he watched very little television. Be that as it may, it would be true to
say that at the time, the new Mrs. Xi Jinping was far more famous than her
husband. The couple had one child, a daughter named Xi Minze born in 1992
and currently a student at Harvard University. In another and more indirect
way, this marriage established a second privileged relationship between Xi
and the PLA. (4)
In 1990, Xi Jinping finally relocated to Fuzhou, the provincial capital, where
he initially spent three years as president of the municipal People’s Congress,
a formal, marginal structure, as well as taking over the directorship of the
local Party school before going on to become secretary of the municipality’s
Party committee and consequently sitting on the provincial CCP Standing
Committee. In 1996, he abandoned these posts in Fuzhou and concentrated
on his work as deputy secretary of Fujian, of which he became governor in
1999. It is undoubtedly at that time that he came to be seen as destined
for a career at the national level. Indeed, during the 15th CCP Congress in
October 1997, he was elected alternate member of the Central Committee
whilst still only secretary of Fuzhou. He was 43.
Fujian, and in particular the special economic zone of Xiamen, was the
scene of many a corruption scandal in the 1990s, the most well-known
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being the Yuanhua affair, named after the company run by businessman Lai
Changxing, who was implicated in large-scale smuggling activities from
Hong Kong with the complicity of many local cadres and the PLA, in par-
ticular the Navy. In February 2000, soon after Lai fled to Canada (where he
managed to remain until 2011 before being extradited to China), (5) Xi Jinping
and the provincial Party secretary at the time, Chen Mingyi, were sum-
moned to Beijing by Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji, and Hu Jintao to report on
this scandal. (6) The episode does not seem to have affected Xi Jinping, who
in 2002 was promoted to governor and soon afterwards Party secretary of
the big neighbouring province of Zhejiang. Certain sources indicate that Xi
may well have helped put an end to the smuggling. (7) However, some of
these decisions were criticised, among them the construction of a new air-
port at Fuzhou and the redevelopment of the centre of the provincial capital
with the help of Hong Kong tycoon Li Kai-shing. Furthermore, several of Xi’s
direct subordinates were involved in corruption. (8)
Throughout these years, Xi Jinping was said to have maintained a simple,
even austere, lifestyle, very different from other children of the red aristoc-
racy and other ambitious young administrators of his generation. He drank
very little, was not known as a philanderer, and continued to go to work on
a bicycle as though he already considered himself destined for a future as
a national figure.
In Fujian, Xi Jinping also acquired a reputation as a realistic, efficient, and
relaxed Party secretary, conscious of the need for China to move towards a
market economy and benefit from foreign investment. It was at this time
that he became known for his motto “Do it immediately!” (mashang jiu
ban!), intended to defeat his subordinates’ tendency towards procrastina-
tion. It has also been said that he accelerated reforms that required gov-
ernment departments to place themselves at the service of society and
business. He was one of the first to surround himself with advisors, drawn
from academia and from outside the bureaucracy. (9) Since Fujian Province
faces Taiwan, Xi considered it an ideal place to develop links with Taiwanese
business people, who saw him as a pragmatic contact despite the military
and political tensions between Beijing and Taipei, especially during the
1995-1996 missile crisis. By the same token, he familiarised himself with
policies regarding Taiwan. He multiplied – and even cultivated, according to
certain sources – contacts with PLA leaders from the military region of Nan-
jing, on which Fujian depended. (10)
Nonetheless, as part of his meticulous preparations for a political future,
he found time between 1998 and 2002 to obtain a doctorate in law at the
Faculty of Humanities of Tsinghua University. The largely political character
of this degree should be regarded with circumspection, however, given that
according to his official biography Xi mainly studied Marxist theory and
“ideological and political education.” (11)
Zhejiang and Shanghai: Decisive staging posts
In 2002, Xi Jinping was transferred to Zhejiang, where he spent five years,
first as deputy Party secretary and interim governor, then very soon after
as secretary of this big coastal province – the richest in China in terms of
average standard of living – until March 2007. It was in these posts that Xi
consolidated his track record as a modernising, reforming administrator,
whilst at the same time developing his international image. In October
2002, during the CCP’s 16th Congress, he became a full member of the Cen-
tral Committee. As Zhejiang’s boss, Xi promoted certain policies that give
an indication of his opinions and priorities.
He was said, for example, to favour private enterprise, the main source of
new jobs in China and pillar of the province’s economy (500,000 of its
680,000 companies are private). However, an inclination cultivated partly
for the purposes of public relations must be treated with caution. Admit-
tedly, like other leaders (Li Keqiang and Jia Qinglin), Xi Jinping had consis-
tently supported the pan-Chinese Federation of Industry and Commerce.
This semi-governmental organisation stimulates, but at the same time con-
trols, the emergence of the private sector, notably through inciting each
company to establish a CCP Committee, and by co-opting the owners of
these companies into the Party and formal state organisations (popular as-
semblies, consultative conferences) in accordance with the new policy rec-
ommended by Jiang Zemin from 2001 onwards (the “Three Represents” or
“three types of representativeness”). In reality, as he indicated several times,
Xi leaned towards the integration of the public and private sectors. The pri-
vate Wahaha Group, based in Hangzhou and partly controlled by this mu-
nicipality, is the best example of this type of integration (for which the
French company Danone paid the price). The entrepreneurial approach that
characterised what was called the Zhejiang Model therefore falls far short
of privatisation of the economy, except perhaps in the Wenzhou region, a
special case. Moreover, although Zhejiang’s prosperity enabled it to abolish
the hukou (residence permit) system, Xi stuck closely to Hu Jintao’s political
line, promising a narrowing of the income gap, the maintenance of “har-
mony” between entrepreneurs and migrant workers, and improvements in
municipal governance. (12)
He was therefore a moderniser. He tried to improve and simplify the ad-
ministrative machine, and according to his hagiographies, to make the
processes of selection and promotion of government cadres more transpar-
ent, introduce forms of external control, and battle abuses of intellectual
and industrial property rights. (13) He is also credited with publicising local
budgets more widely and taking greater account of public opinion, even
though these experiments, notably in the town of Wenling, began before
his arrival in Zhejiang. (14) He travelled a great deal to promote his province
abroad, in the United States and elsewhere.
Yet he was also a realist, conscious of environmental issues, the need to
upgrade industry, and conflicts between interest groups. He gave himself
the objective of closing down polluting, electricity-hungry companies – even
though this objective is far from being achieved – taking as his slogan “co-
ordination and balance.” Lastly, and this is important for the future of the
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centre-periphery relationship, whilst adhering to the “spirit” of central poli-
cies, he used all the leeway that his position as provincial head allowed. This
leads us to believe that he will, in future, avoid asphyxiating the regional
authorities with national directives, except where the supreme interests of
the Party are at stake.
This being the case, in Zhejiang, conscious of an increasing number of in-
dustrial disputes, Xi asked the official unions operating under the direction
of the Party to commit themselves more actively and in a more balanced
way to resolving social tensions. This became known as the Yiwu Model after
a town known for its many private companies and export market in devel-
oping countries. The aim of this model is not only to prevent the emergence
of independent unions, but also to avoid (unlike Guangdong, for example)
the interference of human rights NGOs in the resolution of industrial dis-
putes. (15)
Xi Jinping’s career really gathered speed when he was chosen in March
2007 to replace Chen Liangyu as Shanghai’s Party secretary. Chen was the
second member of the Politburo to have been unseated for corruption since
the beginning of the reforms (in April 2008, he was sentenced to 18 years
in prison). (16) Xi’s role in cleaning up the Fujian administration following the
Yuanhua affair must have played a part in this promotion, which put him in
line for a position on the CCP Politburo. Since the early 1990s, a non-written
rule has made the Party secretaries of Shanghai, Beijing, and Tianjin (and
since 2002, Chongqing) ex officio members of the collegial leadership of
the Party and the country. (17)
Xi’s time in Shanghai was short-lived – seven months – since a second dra-
matic turn of events, or unexpected development, in October 2007 cata-
pulted Xi’s career further forward when he was chosen by the collective
leadership of the Party to succeed Hu Jintao. However, like other former
bosses of Shanghai, including Wu Bangguo and Yu Zhengsheng, Xi Jinping re-
mains a partisan of developing the leading Chinese metropolis as a “double
centre,” that is to say both a financial market and maritime trade platform.(18)
Xi Jinping, future Chinese Number One: 
A man with a consensual approach?
Xi’s brief experience in Shanghai was not unrelated to his promotion. But
more generally, his strength is to appear unconnected to any particular fac-
tion or opinion group, maintaining a balance worthy of Solomon between
promotion of the “Three Represents” (integration of private entrepreneurs
into the Party) dear to the heart of former Party General Secretary Jiang
Zemin, and of the concepts of “harmonious society” and a “scientific ap-
proach to development” forged by Hu Jintao.
Underlying reasons for choosing Xi
As is well known, deep-seated differences have divided the partisans of
Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin over the first successor not to have been chosen
by the generation of revolutionary veterans. While Deng Xiaoping was able
to appoint not only his immediate successor, Jiang (3rd generation of CCP
leaders), but also the successor of his successor, Hu (4th generation), CCP
leaders found themselves in uncharted waters in 2007. Amongst the poten-
tial leaders of the 5th generation, Hu favoured Li Keqiang, a former head of
the Communist Youth League, Hu’s own breeding-ground. Jiang, however,
persuaded the leaders and those of the Party’s elders who were still able-
bodied (Wan Li, Qiao Shi, Song Ping, and Admiral Liu Huaqing) to favour Xi
Jinping, a worthy representative of the red aristocracy and a likely defender
of the Shanghai clique (Shanghai bang) promoted by the former General
Secretary. The Party’s then Number Five, Zeng Qinghong, son of the revo-
lutionary leader Zeng San, played a key role in the promotion of his own
successor, not only to the head of the CCP Secretariat and the Party’s Cen-
tral School, but also to the vice-presidency of the People’s Republic. It was
as though Zeng, too old to take first place, took his revenge by favouring a
close confederate to preside over the country’s destiny. (19)
Admittedly, Hu and his partisans were not completely defeated for all
that. Like Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang was also promoted directly to the Standing
Committee of the CCP Politburo (SCPB) and became the presumed succes-
sor of Premier Wen Jiabao. The choice of Xi nevertheless illustrates the grow-
ing nepotism of a regime that applied a non-written rule, successfully put
forward by certain veterans, including Bo Yibo, Bo Xilai’s father (who died in
2007), in 1992: (20) during the 17th Congress, Xi was one of seven princelings
to join the Politburo (as against three during the preceding Congress). The
political (ensuring the survival of the regime) and economic (protecting the
privileges accrued by the “red princes”) motivations behind this worrying
trend should not be underestimated. (21)
Be that as it may, in September 2010 (three, and not two years later as
some observers had predicted), Xi Jinping joined the Central Military Com-
mission (CMC) of the CCP and became its vice-president. This slight delay
in the “Hu Jintao precedent” (Hu was promoted to this post in 1999, that is
to say two years after the 15th Congress and a year after his election to the
Vice-Presidency of the Republic) may be attributed to Hu’s disgruntlement
with a successor who was not his first choice. But as we will see, it would
be vain to see this as an obstacle to Xi’s replacement of Hu as president of
the CMC in October 2012. And as with Hu in 1997-2002, Xi became in-
creasingly associated with the country’s national affairs and foreign policy
from 2007 to 2008.
Xi and the Party factions
It was the new plan of succession that was to lead certain analysts such
as Cheng Li of the Brookings Institute to elaborate the theory of a funda-
mental opposition between the “elitists,” the princeling faction that included
Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping, Wang Qishan, and Bo Xilai on the one hand, and on
the other, the “populist” faction of the Communist Youth League (tuanpai),
represented by Hu Jintao, Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, and Wang Yang. (22)
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Although seductive in 2007 and widely adopted because it reflects an al-
most perfect balance between these two “factions,” this theory displays
many weaknesses that must be weighed up if we want to understand and
predict the choices that Xi Jinping might make once he becomes China’s
Number One.
It is clear that when he began to relinquish power in 2002, Jiang placed
many representatives of the “Shanghai clique” (Wu Bangguo, Zeng Qing-
hong, and Huang Ju in the SCPB) in key posts. But he also promoted, par-
ticularly within the SCPB, loyal men who have taken other routes such as
Jia Qinglin (former Fujian Party secretary) and Li Changchun (Guangdong).
And since 2007, Jiang’s group of partisans in the SCPB has weakened. Only
Wu Bangguo (Chairman of the National People’s Congress, NPC), Jia Qinglin
(President of the CPPCC), and Li Changchun (in charge of propaganda) have
remained. The new secretary of the Party’s Central Discipline Inspection
Commission, He Guoqiang, and security czar Zhou Yongkang were promoted
by Hu Jintao.23
Secondly, the relationship between Hu and the League has been over-in-
terpreted: not only did Hu not choose all the organisation’s new leaders,
but it has become so common to take this route – Xi Jinping is himself a
product of it – that it cannot be associated with proximity to the current
(and outgoing) General Secretary alone.
Lastly and above all, the opposition between elitism and populism is dif-
ficult to justify, since the new generation of Communist leaders all seem
tempted to combine, in admittedly varying doses, these two natural ten-
dencies of all politicians and political actions. All leaders, including Xi Jinping,
therefore promote a form of modernisation from the top, which reserves a
privileged place for the country’s political, economic, and scientific elites,
but are also increasingly obliged to display a sincere concern for public opin-
ion (or “popular feeling” to use the Communist jargon). They all carry out
opinion polls, the results of which remain secret for the most part. They all
have to deal with a growing number of labour disputes. Moreover, increasing
numbers of them are developing their own populist tendencies, prime ex-
amples being Wen Jiabao (nicknamed Grandfather Wen by the official
“masses” and “China’s best player” by the critic Yu Jie) and Bo Xilai.
In circumstances such as these and in view of recent developments, it is
difficult to class Bo Xilai, the Chongqing Party secretary deposed in March
2012, amongst the elitists: on the contrary, has he not been identified as
the most perfect incarnation of contemporary Chinese populism? Con-
versely, Vice-Premier Li Keqiang would seem more elitist than populist if we
consider in particular his less than remarkable career as governor of Henan
(during the AIDS-contaminated blood scandal) and Liaoning.
In short, this binary dichotomy gives us little information on the choices
and political priorities of future Chinese leaders, in this case Xi Jinping when
he is co-opted as General Secretary and most probably Chairman of the
Party Central Military Commission in autumn 2012, then as President of the
People’s Republic and state CMC Chairman in March 2013. It tells us even
less about how much room for manoeuvre he will have in carrying out the
political programme currently attributed to him.
Xi: A conservative but flexible moderniser
We have seen that in carrying out his local and provincial duties, Xi Jinping
showed himself to be pragmatic, a moderniser, and even reformist. He has
been presented as a defender of the private sector, the market economy,
and the large-scale opening up of China to foreign investment, but we have
been able to qualify this image. We have also seen that he knows how to
be a cautious, orthodox leader, unwilling in his actions, style, and even more
so in his private life to depart from the norm authorised by the Party and
to expose himself to attacks by his detractors. He presents a clear contrast
to someone like Bo Xilai.
From 2007 onwards, as leader of the Secretariat of the Central Committee,
he has unhesitatingly applied the political line laid down by Hu Jintao. He
has favoured a collegial style of working with the other members of an au-
thority above all in charge of Party affairs and reform, and dominated by
Hu’s partisans. In particular, he collaborated closely with Li Yuanchao, head
of the Organisation Department and principal promoter of a new elite, bet-
ter trained and more competent, in the Party’s upper ranks. He left Liu Yun-
shan (close to Hu), head of Propaganda, to work under the tutelage of Li
Changchun (promoted by Jiang), the principal leader of this sector within
the SCPB. And he has worked on a daily basis with Ling Jihua, Hu’s former
right-hand man and powerful Director of the Central Committee’s Depart-
ment of General Affairs, the body that controls the distribution of informa-
tion and official documents. In short, Xi has had no choice but to show
loyalty to Hu and implement his policies.
The same might be said of the role played by Xi in directing the Party’s
Central School. Nothing he says detracts from Hu’s priorities in either ide-
ological or organisational terms. It is true that the project concerning de-
velopment of the Party’s internal democracy (dangnei minzhu) presented
by Hu at the 17th Congress dragged on before being highlighted once again
in June 2012, on the eve and for the requirements of the 18th Congress. But
this cannot be seen as a split between Hu and Xi, since the system remains
organised vertically, and the vague movements towards opening it up, also
recommended by Xi, notably in Zhejiang, quickly came up against Party
rules governing responsibility and promotion. Indeed, in each regional con-
stituency and functional unit, the secretary of the Party Committee remains
the “boss” (yibashou), sole beneficiary of the successes, and taking sole re-
sponsibility for the failures, in his (or her) area, or dare one say, administra-
tive empire.
More recently, just after the Wang Lijun scandal broke – Wang Lijun being
the former head of security in Chongqing who took refuge in the American
Consulate at Chengdu in February 2012 and brought about the disgrace of
Bo Xilai – Xi used his position as head of the Party School, and the school’s
journal, Qiushi (Search for Truth), to reiterate Communist principles regard-
ing moral integrity and the fight against corruption. (24) But here again, al-
though we can attribute greater vigilance to Xi in this domain, he will be
obliged to work with a politico-economic reality that affects the families
of all Party leaders, including his own. (25)
Xi is a good organiser and coordinator. He was able to put these talents
into practice successfully in 2008 while in charge of preparations for the
Beijing Olympic Games. But he is also a leader conscious of the shortcom-
ings and malfunctions of the Chinese bureaucratic system. In recent years
he has taken to task local leaders who, “as at the time of the Great Leap
Forward” (sic dixit), hid reality and flattered central government leaders
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when they made their tours of inspection. (26) Furthermore, through his own
experience and career in several of the country’s poor areas, Xi is more aware
than other leaders of the great disparities within China; disparities and back-
wardness that he does not hesitate to highlight to strengthen his position
in international negotiations.
Yet from a political point of view, Xi could in no sense be described as a
liberal. This was apparent in Zhejiang and has been even more so since his
arrival in Beijing. Following the upheavals of the Arab Spring in early 2011,
Xi has been closely linked to decisions taken by Party leaders (in particular
Hu, Zhou Yongkang, and Li Yuanchao) intended to tighten the authorities’
hold over the Internet, NGOs, and society in general. At the end of last year,
he even called upon universities to consolidate their “ideological work” with
students and strengthen their control over course content. Furthermore, in
his eyes, “social harmony and stability” are essential to the further devel-
opment of economic reforms. It is clear, therefore, that he has never risked
following the example of Wen Jiabao or Guangdong Party secretary Wang
Yang in their calls for political reform.
This caution can also been seen in the way he plays his part as head of
the Party leaders’ group with responsibility for the special administrative
regions (SAR) of Hong Kong and Macau: in 2007, instead of congratulating
himself on the separation of powers that, at least in the former of these re-
gions, constitutes the pillar of rule of law, he gave instructions to the courts
to cooperate more closely with Donald Tsang’s administration. That said,
unlike others, including Liao Hui, former director of the Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office, Xi in 2010 came out in favour of direct negotiation
with Hong Kong’s Democratic Party, enabling a cautious step forward (five
extra members elected to the Legislative Council, that is to say, 40 out of
70) on the road to political reform in the SAR. (27)
More generally, like the team from which they are preparing to take over,
Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang are conscious of the need to hasten transformation
of the growth model towards an economy stimulated more by internal con-
sumption than by investment and export. It is hard to see any differences
between Xi and other Chinese leaders where this general trend is concerned.
There has been a great deal of discussion since the summer of 2011 on
the opposition between the Guangdong Model promoted by Wang Yang,
whose priority is increasing the size of the “pie,” and the Chongqing Model
promoted by Bo Xilai, former boss of China’s fourth largest municipality,
which aims (or aimed) for a fairer distribution of the “pie.” Where does Xi
stand in this debate? Probably in favour of a synthesis of the two “models,”
which have more points in common than is often supposed. In line with the
Guangdong Model, Xi is trying to improve the quality of the “pie” (upgrading
companies and developing green industries), and in line with the Chongqing
Model, he shows concern over deepening inequalities and will certainly de-
velop Wen Jiabao’s plans to improve and extend social security systems
(health, retirement, and unemployment). Unlike Bo, however, he knows that
the growth rate of the Chinese economy, still around 8 percent in 2012, can
only progressively fall. Unlike Bo, and despite the talents of his wife, he has
shown little enthusiasm for bringing revolutionary songs back into favour.
Unlike Bo he is reluctant to adopt a crowd-pleasing style and even less so
to reintroduce a form of the personality cult. Consequently, although like
eight of the nine members of the SCPB – the only exception is Hu Jintao –
Xi has made the Chongqing pilgrimage since the arrival of Bo Xilai at its
head, he has kept his distance from model and promoter alike. (28)Yet he has
shown similar caution with regard to the most innovative experiments of
Wang Yang, in particular Wang’s management of the Wukan crisis (the dis-
missal at the beginning of 2012 of its corrupt leaders, accused of having
abusively expropriated villagers’ lands and organising new elections), on
which Xi has refrained from commenting, at least publicly.
At the international level, Xi has gained a wealth of experience in recent
years – much more, if measured in the number of trips he has made (47
countries visited), than his predecessor. (29) However, during these official
visits, he has sought to emphasise his personal charm rather than original
ideas. The substance of his speeches has mostly remained within well-de-
fined limits, coded, or insignificant.
Nonetheless, there have been two unexpected or noticeable exceptions.
The first, which occurred in Qatar in June 2008, concerns his answer to
questions from Hong Kong journalists on the controversy over the Olympic
torch fiasco in France. Xi remained serene, saying he was not too worried
about the inevitable criticisms from outside China, which he saw as a largely
inoffensive part of the world’s “diversity.” (30) In short, his answer corre-
sponded to a conflict-avoidance strategy, also recommended, at least until
summer 2008, by Hu. The second exception is much better known and more
pointed. Addressing the Chinese community in Mexico in February 2009, he
declared, “There exist well-fed foreigners who have nothing better to do
than criticise our country. China is not exporting revolution, hunger, and
poverty. China is giving no one headaches. What more do you want?” (31)
Xi Jinping, nationalist? Most certainly! According to Kuhn, his quasi-official
biographer, in Xi’s eyes, patriotism and national pride contribute to stimu-
lating development. “Our commitment and determination are anchored in
our historic and national pride.” (32) Xi will not adopt a low profile on the in-
ternational stage, confirmation of the distance he is keeping from recom-
mendations made in former years by Deng Xiaoping in the aftermath of
Tiananmen (taoguang yanghui).
That said, China’s major partners, headed by the United States, are having
difficulty identifying any special or original outlook in Xi. His two official
meetings with Vice-President Joe Biden (August 2011 in China and February
2012 in the United States) have not helped a great deal, even though Wik-
ileaks has revealed – and it is hardly a surprise – that Xi leans towards co-
operation rather than confrontation. (33) Similarly, Japan, which received a
visit from Xi in December 2009, is no better informed. On the one hand, Xi
insisted on a deviation from Japanese protocol during his visit by requesting
and obtaining, in a lapse of time considered much too short, an audience
with Emperor Akihito, giving rise to negative rather than positive reactions
in the archipelago. On the other hand, in April 2012, following a proposal
from the Mayor of Tokyo, the iconoclast Ishihara Shintarô, to buy some of
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the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, he saw fit as future leader to add his voice to
Chinese warnings to Tokyo on the subject of what he called one of China’s
“fundamental interests.” (34) Lastly, on military and security questions, we
are no better informed. Xi has on several occasions praised the integration
of the civil and military industries and what Chinese jargon terms “a syn-
thesis of war and peace” (pingzhan heyi), displaying particular interest in
the increase in power of the PLA and improvements in the preparation of
its members (both active and reservists) and equipment. This position is
neither particularly original nor new, yet it allows him to appear a defender
of the military institution and strengthens his already numerous links with
its leaders. Amongst those close to Xi in the Army, besides Xu Qiliang, the
Air Force commander who may take over the Vice-Chairmanship of the
CMC, there is Ma Xiaotian, Chief of Staff in charge of information; Liu Yuan
(son of Liu Shaoqi, former Chinese president), political commissioner of the
General Department of Logistics; and Zhang Haiyang (son of General Zhang
Zhen), political commissioner of the Second Artillery (strategic forces and
missiles). The last three are also princelings who will be called upon, if they
succeed in distancing themselves from Bo Xilai, to accede to the CMC during
the CCP’s 18th Congress. (35) This shortage of information does not mean that
Xi lacks charisma. On the contrary, if a major difference between Xi and Hu
exists, it is certainly that unlike his predecessor, when he enters an assembly,
Xi makes his presence felt immediately. He smiles and is expressive, warm,
and communicative. He gives the impression of being human, made of flesh
and blood, a person with feelings, tastes, and preferences rather than a robot
or prison door. He is, moreover, a far better communicator than his prede-
cessor.
This does not tell us what Xi will do once he comes to power, however. As
we have seen, like Hu when he advanced in the shadow of Jiang, he has too
often avoided taking an original stance on any subject whatsoever. However,
the system lends itself to this and it would be wrong to draw too many
conclusions one way or another on the basis of our knowledge of the dec-
larations or past actions of Xi Jinping. Admittedly, unlike Hu, Xi belongs to
a family reputedly more reformist than that of Bo Yibo or of Zhang Zhen,
former vice-chairman of the CMC. For example, unlike Bo Xilai’s father, Xi
Zhongxun defended Hu Yaobang when the latter was stripped of his func-
tions in January 1987 after the previous month’s student demonstrations.
He is also said to have criticised the Tiananmen repression in 1989. (36) How-
ever, we may cautiously wager that Xi is a conservative but flexible mod-
erniser, and therefore capable, up to a certain point, of adapting to
circumstances that are by definition unpredictable.
Constraints on the future of Xi as Number
One
Two types of constraints are likely to seriously limit Xi’s room to manoeu-
vre in a way that is currently uncertain: the first are institutional and polit-
ical, while the second are social and potentially political.
Institutional and political constraints
Since Deng Xiaoping’s death, the Chinese political system has evolved to-
wards a form of authoritarianism whose principle of group directorship has
exacerbated fragmentation. If we take stock of the Hu years, we might reach
the conclusion that Hu proved to be a more consensual primus inter pares
and consequently weaker and more indecisive than his predecessor. When
forced to take a sensitive decision, Hu frequently took refuge in a cautious
wait-and-see strategy, leaving the SCPB to settle matters on a majority basis
once Party veterans had been duly consulted. He also more often let local
leaders try out their own solutions. There is no lack of examples, but the Bo
Xilai affair is a recent and eloquent illustration of Hu’s inability to put an
end to a tendency that Party leaders had long known was dangerous.
Xi Jinping must therefore not only consolidate his power as number one,
notably through the promotion of a certain number of protégés in the years
to come, but also be capable of imposing his decisions when necessary. Will
he have the means to do this?
Up until now, Xi has not had to settle or handle a political, economic, so-
cial, or international crisis from a front-line position. He has, for example,
remained very discreet on the Bo Xilai affair. Consequently, his abilities in
such situations have not been put to the test. His capacity to surmount
these trials will not depend solely on his talents as an organiser or even on
the charisma he is reputed to have. It will depend on his skill in building a
fairly solid political coalition to negotiate such crises.
However, Xi will have to work with a team co-opted mainly by Hu Jintao
and to a lesser extent by Jiang Zemin and his allies. It is true that the Bo
Xilai affair has weakened the neo-conservative camp that sought to con-
solidate the role of the public sector and return to a type of Maoism. Fur-
thermore, the Politburo will doubtless gain a greater number of reformists,
including Wang Yang, who is expected to join the SCPB, and Secretariat
member Wang Huning, a former academic from Shanghai University who
may take charge of Foreign Affairs. (37) Xi may also benefit from a shrinking
of the SCPB from nine to seven members, and the possible exclusion from
the Politburo of the most powerful provincial leaders, if rumours circulating
in Beijing and Hong Kong in early 2012 are confirmed. (38) A smaller SCPB is
better able to make decisions and reach consensus, and if the security ap-
paratus is weakened when no longer represented, the same logic would
apply to the leaders of the major municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin,
and Chongqing) and provinces (such as Guangdong), which were until the
18th Party Congress represented in the Politburo. However, most other po-
tential members of this collective leadership will be former protégés of Hu,
including Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, probably Liu Yunshan (head of the Secre-
tariat and director of the Party’s School, then Vice-President of the Republic)
in charge of ideology, and Liu Yandong, (39) who will take over the Chairman-
ship of the CPPCC. Only the Secretary of Shanghai, Yu Zhengsheng, who
may direct the NPC, and Wang Qishan, probable future Number Two in the
government, although promoted by Hu, seem less close to Xi and more re-
formist.
One last important issue is clearly the question of the CMC chairmanship.
Up until recently, most observers (myself excepted) favoured repetition of
the Jiang Zemin precedent, by which the former leader would retain control
of this authority for two more years after leaving his position as Party head
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(from 2002 to 2004). The explosion of the Bo Xilai affair is thought to have
precipitated things and to have led to a form of bargaining between Jiang
Zemin and Hu Jintao: in exchange for Bo Xilai’s head, Hu would lose that of
the CMC! (40) The dual logic of this aggiornamento is clear. On the one hand,
the management would regain a united façade by cutting off the rotten
branch embodied by Bo, his wife Gu Kailai, accused of murder, and their re-
spective families. On the other, Xi would begin his mandate (in principle,
five years renewable once) in a stronger position than his predecessor.
The resultant sidelining of security chief Zhou Yongkang, said to be very
close to Bo Xilai (but who has formally continued his duties and retained
his place within the SCPB, probably until the 18th Congress), and the infor-
mation we have gathered on the latter’s power-taking strategy with the
possible help of Zhou – including tapping the phones of Hu Jintao and other
central leaders – shows that they increase the risk of political instability in
China and the uncertainties weighing on the future of Xi Jinping. These are
all questions that will be added to the social, and potentially political, chal-
lenges that the Chinese authorities will have to face in the years to come.
Social and political challenges
For Xi Jinping, Bo’s downfall is clearly a poisoned chalice. This unexpected
event could allow Xi to consolidate his power more rapidly than expected,
in particular if Hu leaves the field open to him or gives him his support. Be-
sides, Bo’s purge has removed a challenger from amongst the leaders, an-
other no less ambitious princeling, suspected of wanting to defy Xi after
one or two years in the SCPB by taking advantage of his own links with the
Army and security bodies. For Xi, it would be better that the boil is lanced
before, rather than after, the 18th Congress.
However, Xi is taking over the post of General Secretary at a particularly
sensitive moment. The Party leadership is divided. The reformists, led by
Wen Jiabao, want to push their advantage and launch political reform, the
exact content of which is unknown but which has been disparaged by the
conservatives. Labour unrest is increasing. Economic development is slowing
down whilst the implementation of a new growth model is far from guar-
anteed. By uncovering an unprecedented quantity of information on the
abuse of privilege and on wide-ranging corruption in the upper echelons of
the Nomenklatura, the Bo Xilai scandal has seriously challenged the legiti-
macy of the CCP and has consequently tarnished the image of all the
princelings, of which Xi is also an important representative and to which,
according to Wikileaks, Xi himself attributes a vital historic role. (41) Lastly,
the position of the reformists and that of Xi have been strengthened by the
cooperative role played by the Obama administration in the current tran-
sition. Not only did the US help the Chinese authorities deal with the Bo
Xilai crisis by delivering Wang Lijun to the central bodies of Chinese security
and observing a code of silence on what they obtained in terms of confi-
dences, (42) but later in the spring, in April-May 2012, it did all it could to
favour a positive outcome for the diplomatic crisis brought about by the
flight of the blind dissident Chen Guangcheng from a village in Shandong
where he was held, quite illegally and against his wishes, before being trans-
ferred in extraordinary circumstances to the United States Embassy in Bei-
jing with the help of underground Protestant networks that are more
powerful than the authorities imagine. For the nationalists, these two crises
have contributed to weakening the status and prestige of the Chinese gov-
ernment in the face of its ideological and strategic enemies headed by the
United States. What is more, these nationalists have not accepted their pro-
visional defeat any better than the Party conservatives and other partisans
of Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang.
Conclusion
Consequently, Xi Jinping will need the full support of the outgoing team
and in particular of Hu, Wen, the PLA, and the security apparatus in order
to succeed. The weakening of the conservative camp and the necessity for
reforms will help, as will the provinces that have already embarked on at
least some of the structural measures that China must now implement on
the advice of the government’s reformists and following the recommenda-
tions of the World Bank. However, China is undoubtedly entering a zone of
deeper political uncertainty, if not upheaval. Xi will therefore need to bring
into play all the talents we know him to possess – or that have been attrib-
uted to him – to succeed in leading the world’s second largest economy to-
wards a political, institutional, and legal environment that is more in tune
with the expectations of its population and the international community.
He will also have to be capable of maintaining his control both over the
processes already in motion and the social fabric as a whole. In the years to
come, the role of the security forces and the military is highly likely to in-
crease rather than diminish, and their submission to the Party will become
even more of a vital issue. Lastly, and above all, we must not forget that in
presiding over the destiny of a society in rapid transformation, Xi will doubt-
less be forced, depending on circumstances, to take decisions and introduce
reforms to which he is currently opposed, or even some that he cannot at
present imagine. According to Wikileaks, Xi has said that his experience in
the north of Shaanxi during the Cultural Revolution taught him “to face up
to all challenges, believe in the impossible and overcome all obstacles with-
out panicking.” (43) Will he prove worthy of the task that awaits him? Perhaps,
but only perhaps.
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